Political Rhetoric: The Modern Parrhesia by Townsend, Jessica
The Catalyst
Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 5
2017
Political Rhetoric: The Modern Parrhesia
Jessica Townsend
University of Southern Mississippi, jessica.m.townsend@usm.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://aquila.usm.edu/southernmisscatalyst
Part of the Political Theory Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catalyst by an
authorized editor of The Aquila Digital Community. For more information, please contact Joshua.Cromwell@usm.edu.
Recommended Citation
Townsend, Jessica (2017) "Political Rhetoric: The Modern Parrhesia," The Catalyst: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.
DOI: 10.18785/cat.0401.05
Available at: http://aquila.usm.edu/southernmisscatalyst/vol4/iss1/5
Political Rhetoric: The Modern 
Parrhesia
The Catalyst
Volume 4 | Issue 1 | Article 5
2017
Jessica Townsend
38TOWNSEND A5 
The French philosopher Michel Foucault is 
best known among academics as a theorizer 
of human nature and social relationships. 
Although his areas of expertise did not 
encompass politics, which he attempted 
to avoid altogether in his writings, many 
of his philosophical ideas have been re-
examined inside a political context. One of 
his major theories, the idea of free speech 
known as parrhesia, has made its way to the 
foreground of scrutiny by political theorists 
as well as an internationally-acclaimed 
expert in rhetoric and professor by the name 
Laurent Pernot. Since Michel Foucault’s 
original historical analysis of parrhesia, or 
frankly-spoken truth, on which he lectured 
at the University of California at Berkeley in 
1983, the subject of parrhesia in society has 
continued to be an ongoing topic of interest 
for philosophers and social scientists alike. 
While Foucault was not so interested in the 
implications of parrhesia in contemporary 
politics and preferred to focus on the 
ethical aspect of parrhesia instead (Pernot 
2016), his discourse and implications have 
nevertheless supplied political scientists with 
a vast concept to explore. Despite the fact 
that he dismissed rhetoric as incompatible 
with parrhesia based on the form of speech 
(Foucault 1983), Foucault never addresses 
certain inconsistencies with this claim (Pernot 
2016). Nevertheless, Laurent Pernot’s 
argument for compatibility between rhetoric 
and parrhesia in the political arena does 
take into account Foucault’s requirements 
for parrhesia, and further evidence for a 
relationship between parrhesia and rhetoric 
can be determined through Foucault’s own 
research on modernity. 
Foucault’s concept of parrhesia defines a 
practice of truth-telling that necessitates 
certain circumstances. To meet the 
requirements of parrhesia, one must speak 
the truth frankly, risk oneself in some 
substantial manner by speaking this truth, use 
this truth to criticize the audience, and feel a 
sense of duty to speak this criticism (Foucault 
1983). The risk that goes along with parrhesia 
typically includes risk of life, punishment, or 
significant loss of social standing. Because of 
this, the truth-teller must be subordinate to 
the audience. However, the one speaking with 
parrhesia, the parrhesiastes, also must be free 
to speak the truth freely of his own accord; 
meaning that he must also not be a slave or 
non-citizen, in the case of ancient Greece 
(Foucault 1983).
 
It is this attribute of frankness which causes 
Foucault to determine that rhetoric is 
incompatible with parrhesia (Foucault 1983). In 
his lectures, Foucault refers to rhetoric as that 
form of speech where the speaker uses vague 
terms and oblique explanations to convince his 
audience of his point, whether it is a truthful 
point or not; in contrast, he paints parrhesia 
as being the more direct and concise form of 
speech to convey what the speaker truthfully 
believes (1983). Similarly, Foucault rejects the 
concept of parrhesia in rhetoric because of the 
dialect used; he says, “The continuous long 
speech is a rhetorical or sophistical device, 
whereas the dialogue through questions and 
answers is typical for parrhesia” (1983). In 
short, he determines that rhetoric is only to be 
applied in long, vague speeches, and parrhesia 
requires that the language be direct and the 
speech be in a conversational format.
 “Foucault’s main focus, is 
actually a newer form of 
political parrhesia in which a 
citizen speaks truthfully to his 
superior or ruler in order to 
critique policies.”
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Laurent Pernot, in his lecture on rhetoric and 
parrhesia, argues that rhetoric and parrhesia 
are very compatible (2016). Referencing 
Foucault’s preference to historical analysis, 
Pernot argues that Foucault neglected 
a branch of parrhesia, which he refers to 
as political parrhesia (2016). In his lecture 
in 2016, Pernot asserted that political 
parrhesia, which is the equivalent of rhetoric, 
is actually the root of ethical parrhesia, which 
is the form of parrhesia of which Foucault 
spoke: the aforementioned direct truth-
telling in dialectic format. Rhetoric, according 
to Pernot, is the original political speech; it 
could be seen historically when a citizen of 
Athens would give a speech to the senate 
(2016). Pernot asserts that ethical parrhesia, 
Foucault’s main focus, is actually a newer 
form of political parrhesia in which a citizen 
speaks truthfully to his superior or ruler in 
order to critique policies (2016). Instead of 
speaking generally to a congregation, the 
speaker is specifically directing his speech 
at the ruler (2016). Despite the fact that 
the political parrhesiastes is not directing 
his critique specifically at the overall ruler, 
Pernot insists that there is still some level of 
risk to the speaker; his reputation could be 
ruined, he could be exiled for corruption, or 
he could lose his rights to speak (2016). In 
this case, the speaker is not challenging the 
ruler, but instead the ruling majority (2016). 
 
Similarly, the political parrhesiastes, 
or rhetorician, may meet the other 
requirements of parrhesia (2016). Although 
they may speak in long lectures, they may 
speak frankly therein (2016). Although they 
may speak vaguely and guide the audience 
toward their own conclusions, they may do 
so in a dialectic format (2016). Socrates, for 
example, is a good example of this; although 
he conversed with his arguers in such a way 
to debate the topic, he was also very well-
known for not giving any direct 
answers (2016). 
 
The link between Foucault’s parrhesia 
and Pernot’s rhetoric may be more easily 
understood if one takes into account Foucault’s 
interpretation of enlightenment and modernity. 
Foucault describes the Enlightenment as “the 
age of the critique,” (1984, 38), referencing 
the philosopher Immanuel Kant to show how 
enlightenment is the application of reason and 
logic to determine the best circumstances in 
a situation (1984, 37). Foucault then describes 
modernity as relating to enlightenment as an 
attitude toward the contemporary instead of an 
overall ideal (1984, 39). In this way, modernity 
is an attitude that takes into account the 
current state of affairs both political and ethical; 
instead of simply being a way to perceive 
the present, however, it is a way to operate 
within the present in order to improve existing 
circumstances inside the confines of the current 
situation (Foucault 1984, 40-41).
 
Keeping this concept of modernity in mind, 
it becomes easier to see how rhetoric may 
relate to parrhesia. The relationship would be 
similar to that of enlightenment and modernity; 
whereas ethical parrhesia is the frank truth-
telling of present circumstances to a ruler, 
rhetoric is that parrhesia which requires 
a gentler nudge in the direction of truth 
according to the constraints of the situation 
at that time. Considering Socrates once more, 
his debates with others often resulted in the 
opposing arguer realizing that he no longer 
believed or understood what he previously 
thought was certain. If Socrates at this time 
had simply told his arguers what was wrong 
with their reasoning, they would not have 
been convinced of these truths; they would 
have called him mad, ignored him altogether, 
or simply had him indicted of corruption much 
earlier in life because of such controversial 
beliefs. Instead, Socrates used a rhetorical line 
of questioning to gently lead his arguers into 
their own conclusions so that they applied their 
own reasoning to discern the truth. In this way, 
Socrates had an attitude of modernity which 
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required him to use political parrhesia over 
ethical parrhesia in order to obtain the 
desired results. 
 
These same concepts may be applied to 
politicians today. Although politicians in the 
United States are viewed in a very negative 
manner, and many of them use rhetoric to 
convince the audience of what they want 
instead of what they actually believe as 
Foucault says, those politicians that are 
truth-tellers must still use rhetoric in order 
to lead the audience down the correct 
path of reasoning. While these politicians 
may currently be in a position of political 
power, it is important to note that they still 
risk their careers in truth-telling even now, 
particularly in democratic nations such as 
the United States where the voters hold the 
power to elect or reprimand their political 
representatives. To speak truthfully to their 
constituents can be risky for remaining in 
office or future elections, even when using 
that gentler form of political parrhesia 
instead of the blunt honesty of ethical 
parrhesia. 
At this point it is paramount to distinguish 
between rhetoric as political parrhesia 
and the rhetoric used to incite a certain 
feeling in an audience without reasoning 
or logic to support it, which has become 
ever more present in modern politics. 
Political parrhesia still presupposes a line 
of clear reasoning supported by evidence 
and logic, while the former rhetoric only 
aims to convince the audience based on 
emotional response, such as fear or pride. 
A politician that utilizes political parrhesia 
would guide his or her constituents to the 
truth by means of observable evidence and 
reasoning, not simply subjective opinions 
or baseless claims. While active politicians 
may utilize both of these forms of rhetoric, 
it is only political parrhesia that is related 
to modernity and therefore ethical parrhesia. 
Being able to distinguish between these two 
forms of rhetoric in practice is a more difficult 
task, and frequently the way a politician is 
perceived in this regard is what may tip favor 
toward or against him or her.
 
Although Foucault’s limited views of parrhesia 
caused him to miss entirely the concept of 
rhetoric in parrhesia, it is Foucault’s work 
on modernity and parrhesia that enables 
the determination of relationship between 
political parrhesia and ethical parrhesia. 
Through his study of parrhesia, Foucault 
built the groundwork for Pernot’s research 
into rhetoric and the two distinct forms of 
parrhesia, enabling him to ascertain the link 
between rhetoric and political parrhesia. It is 
through Foucault’s studies on enlightenment 
and modernity that one can then discern the 
link between ethical parrhesia and political 
parrhesia that Foucault missed on his own. 
This was surely largely in part due to his 
quick dismissal of rhetoric in his early studies. 
Nevertheless, this relationship between 
parrhesia and rhetoric is clear to see once 
one locates the essential points, and then 
it can be utilized to more easily understand 
how truthful speech between politicians and 
their constituents is conveyed today. 
